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By Janice G. Inman
D
In September, the Institute of
Medicine of the National Academy
of Sciences, a congressionally cre-
ated entity dedicated to the study
of policy matters pertaining to the
public health, issued the results of
the study of federal drug safety
policy commissioned by the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA).
The resulting report, tided "The
. Future of Drug Safety, Promoting
and Protecting the Health of the
Public" and published in the
Arcbuescf Internal Medicine, has
been widely anticipated in light of
recent publicity surrounding
Vioxx® and other drugs that, sub-
sequent to FDA-approval, proved
more dangerous than thought.
TIle authors' goals in carrying out
the study included gaining a better
understanding of the FDA's cur-
rent role and the roles of other
actors in the process and assessing
how changes in these organiza-
tions and systems could help pro-
mote increased drug safety and
better public confidence. The
committee's bottom line assess-
ment was that major changes in




The Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research (COER) at the FDA
weighs the risks and benefits of
new drugs, but thorough oversight
of approved medications is lacking,
continued on page 8
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Daubert established that the test for
expert testimony admissibility would
be whether it foUowed the rules of the
scientific method. Before Daubert, the
Frye test, enunciated in Frye v. U.S.,
293 Fed.1013 ( D.C. Cir. 1923), had
been the norm. Frye aUowed judges
to exclude evidence from expert wit-
nesses if it had not been "generaUy
accepted."
In 1975, the Federal Rules of
Evidence were enacted. FRE 702 rep-
resented a direct challenge to Frye by
stating that expert testimony would
be admissible as long as it assisted
whoever was responsible for deter-
mining the facts of a case - usuaUy
a jury. The testimony no longer had
to meet the "general acceptance"
standard. However, defense-oriented
critics asserted that Rule 702 allowed
experts to present shoddy or "junk
science" to juries in support of plain-
tiff injury claims.
Daubert
Daubert was decided at a time
when "novel" no longer meant "SlIS-
peer," and the Supreme Court speci-
fied in Daubert that the foUowing five
factors should be considered in assess-
ing the reliability of scientific testimo-
ny: I) whether the expert's hypothesis
has been tested; 2) whether there has
been peer review and publication of
the methodology; 3) the frequency of
erroneous results; 4) standards con-
trolling the technique's operations;
and 5) acceptance of the methodology
in the scientific community.
Under Daubert, judges were assigned
a "gatekeeper' role to determine whether
the expert's methodology was sound. In
Harold]. Bursztajn, MD, a member
of this newsletter's Board of Editors, is
co-director of the program in psychia-
try and the law at Harvard Medical
School. Milo Fox Pulde, MD, prac-
tices internal medicine at Brigham and
Women's Hospital in Chestnut Hill,
MA. Darlyn Prakitiku1r is a premed-
ical graduate of Princeton University.
Michael L Perlin is a professor of
law at New York Law School. The
authors would like to thank Thomas
G. Gntheil and Robert M. Hamm for
their helpful editorial comments.
civil cases, po.·it-DaUbert courts are more
likely to exclude challenged expert evi-
dence than they had been before under
the Frye standard. Dixon and Gill (2001)
found that chaUenged expert evidence
was excluded about 50'10 of the time pre-
Daubert. Saks M, Faigman D: Expert
Evidence After Daubert 1 Ann Rev Law
and Social Science 105, (2005), That fig-
ure rose to as much as 700!o in years post-
Daubert. Dixon L, Gill B: Changes in the
Standards for Admitting Expert Evidence
in Federal Civil Cases Since the Daubert
Decision (2001). Daubert's requirement"
when implemented, have thus had pro-
found implications for both medical
experts and lawyers.
Though Daubert signaled the intent
of the court to establish explicit scientif-
ically based rules of admissibility and
hold the testimony of medical experts
to a higher standard, the reality of the
practical application of these rules sug-
gests that we have not come far from
the comments of Judge Hand in 1901:
"No one will deny that the law should
in some way effectively use expert
knowledge wherever it will aid in set-
tling disputes. The only question is as to
how it can do so best." teamed Hand.
Historical and Practical Considerations
Regarding Expert Testimony. 15 Haru.
L. Rev. 40 (1901).
Kumho
It took the Kumbo ruling to extend
Daubert from scientific to clinical
expert opinion formulation and testi-
mony: "The objective of [the Daubert
gatekeeping] requirement is to ensure
the reliability and relevancy of expert
testimony. It is to make certain that
an expert, whether basing testimony
upon professional studies or personal
experience, [should employ] in the
courtroom the same level of intellec-
tual rigor that characterizes the prac-
tice of an expert in the relevant field."
Kumbo did more than simply
restate the holding of Daubert. It
held that the Daubert "gatekeeping"
obligation applies to both testimony
based on "scientific" knowledge, as
well as that based on "technical" and
"other specialized" knowledge. In
making the gatekeeping determina-
tion, the trial court "may" consider
one or more of the five specific
Daubert factors if it will help ascertain
continued on page 4
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Emotional Damages
continued from page 3
a thing income which is not so in fact."
Burk- Waggoner Oil Association v.
Hopkins, 269 u.s. 110, 114 (925), If
the amount received by Murphy was
for something that is normally not
taxed, it could nor fit within the defi-
nition of income under the Sixteenth
Amendment.
The amounts paid to Murphy were
not on account of lost wages or tax-
able earnings. To the contrary, the
COLIrt found that they were paid to
her to make her "emotionally and
reputation ally whole." The amounts
paid were intended to return her rep-
utation to the state that existed prior
to the harm which she suffered.
There was no addition to or acces-
sion to wealth but rather a restora-
tion. If what Murphy received was
not income, taxing the damage award
was beyond the grant of congression-
al authority granted by the Framers in
the Sixteenth Amendment. This, how-
ever, was not the sole test.
When determining whether legisla-
tion passes muster with the Sixteenth
Amendment, the Supreme COlin has
commanded that courts should rely
"upon the commonly understood
meaning of the term which must have
been in the minds of the people"
when the amendment was adopted.
Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v.
Smietanka, 255 u.s. 509, 519 (921).
So the Framers understanding of the
word "incomes" should also play a
role in the outcome of this inquiry.
Following the passage of the
Sixteenth Amendment, Congress
enacted and then revised the Code
three times. TI,e Act of 1918 did not
distinguish between physical and non-
physical injuries. However, positions
advanced by both the Attorney
General of the United States in 1918
and a Treasury Department ruling sug-
gest that, in 1918, compensation for
personal injuries which were not relat-
ed to lost wages or earnings were
thought not to be within the meaning
of "incomes" as used in the Sixteenth
Amendment. 31 Op. Atty. Gen. 304,
308 (918); T.O. 27247 20 Treas. Dec.
Int. Rev. 457 (918). At the time that
the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted,
the court noted, 39 of the 48 states had
laws for the recovery of damages on
account of "mental suffering" and
recovery for nonphysical injury was
pursued in the same manner as phys-
ical injuries. Recoveries for both phys-
ical and nonphysical harms resulting
from tort-like acts were pursued in the
same matter without distinction or
allocation bern' ceo them, and were
treated in similar fashion in the courts.
When the Sixteenth Amendment was
adopted in 1918, all such recoveries
were understood to be something
other than "incomes" as that term was
used. The court noted that the IRS
held the very same view in 1922. Sol.
Op. 132 1-1 C.R. 92, 93, 1922. The
court concluded that "compensation
for the loss of a personal attribute,
such as well-being or a good repura-
tion ... arc not received in lieu of
income." The Framers understood that
all personal injury recoveries were not
-, income, regardless of the presence or
absence of physical manifestation. As
such, any legislation which draws into
the ambit of income items those things
the framers of the Sixteenth Amend-
ment understood to be nontaxable is
by definition unconstitutional.
WHAT MURPHY MEANS TO
YOUR CLIENTS
If the Murphy opinion stands, it
promises to affect cases that have been
settled, gone to verdict, are presently
in the courts or are merely disputes in
gestation. For those cases that have not
been resolved yet, the cost of resolu-
tion may well have gone down.
Excluding recoveries for personal
injuries without physical manifestation
- for emotional distress, damage to
reputation, or psychological harm, to
name a few - from the definition of
income under Code Section 61 means
that plaintiffs now have nearly 4lY'1o
more of their recoveries available to
them without diminution by taxes.
For those cases already resolved,
whether by verdict or settlement,
plaintiffs have filed income tax returns
reporting their awards and recoveries
as taxable income. For those settle-
ments involving the 2003 taxable year
and thereafter, plaintiffs should now
consider filing claims for refund.
Outside of the Fifth Circuit these claims
will invariably be denied. Plaintiffs
across the country would then be able
to bring their own refund suits citing
Murphy as authority for recovery of
taxes paid on awards for nonphysical
harms suffered from tort like acts.
The IRS is carefully considering its
next move. The Murphy decision was
penned by the Circuit's Chief Judge
and was unanimous, suggesting that
en bane review might very well come
out the same way. It is possible that
the IRS might petition for certiorari
given that a lower court struck down
federal legislation on constitutional
ground"). Other taxpayers around the
country might file their claims for
refund and, when denied, take their
claims to their respective Circuit
Court, of Appeal, potentially creating
a conflict among the Circuits, again
enticing the Supreme Court to act,
albeit on a delayed basis. No matter
what happens next, we have this sur-
prising decision from what was
thought to be a routine matter. Clients
and counsel alike should begin to
take steps necessary to capitalize on
this opportunity. Details on the final
chapter are sure to follow.
Clinicians
continued from page 2
whether the testimony is "reliable."
Overall, Kumbo found that the test
for reliability is flexible and that
"Daubert's list of specific factors nei-
ther necessarily nor exclusively
applies to aIJ experts in every case.
Rather the law grants a district court
the same broad latitude when it
decides how to determine reliability
as it enjoys in respect of its ultimate
reliability determination."
Commentary on Kumbo has been
mixed. While some have applauded
Kumho for admitting certain expert
evidence rather than simply banishing
it as non-science; others have also
raised concerns about the role of
judges, and how Kumho may in effect
be replacing the word of experts with
the word of judges, "Together, Daubert
continued on page 5
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and Kumbo Tire do a remarkably clear
job of commanding judges to proper-
iy scrutinize fields, presumably includ-
ing the forensic identification sciences,
before admitting opinions from those
fields' practitioners. But one can never
underestimate the ingenuity of judges
in finding ways to evade rules that tell
them to do something that would lead
to a result contrary to the one sug-
gested by their intuitions." Saks MJ:
Banishing Ipse Dixit: The Impact of
Kumbo Tire on Forensic Identification
Science. 57 Wasb. & lee L Rev. 880,
880 (2000).
Others have been less receptive to
Kumbo. One observer, by way of
example, saw Kumbo as an effective
undoing of Daubert: "[Tlhe Daubert
factors mayor may not be relevant to
the reliability of the proffered expert
testimony. The problem, though, is
that Kumbo leaves judges with almost
no guidance about how to determine
whether such testimony is reliable."
Haack S: Defending Science Within
Reason. 254 (2003). However, it
should be noted that Kumbo does
emphasize the need for corrigibility
- or correctibthry - rather than a
simple "it is because I say SQ."
In its emphasis on making transpar-
ent and thus corrigible the process by
which existing data is connected to
offered opinion, Kumbo is well in
tunc with current clinical practice stan-
dards. Medical experts now practice in
a climate in which the previously pri-
vate world of doctor and patient has
come alive with the sounds of doctors
justifying their decisions to a variety of
third parties as well as with increas-
ingly informed and mistrustful
patients. The Internet information
explosion, reduction of time with
patients and the need to justify deci-
sion-making to nonclinical third par-
ties have placed greater emphasis on
patient education and the corrigibility
of clinician reasoning. However, it is
important to note that, while physi-
cians should make use of the current
best available external evidence about
medical care (as the practice of evi-
dence based medicine calls for), such
physicians also need to be wary of
turning this practice into a substitute
for actually assessing the primary liter-
ature and understanding its validity.
Physicians need to be able to change
their minds, to update, revise, and dis-
cover and then justify their opinions as
new reasons are offered, data intro-
duced and analyses completed. In
effect, clinicians now often practice in
a consultative mode where trans-
parency of clinical judgment and
accountability under conditions of
clinical uncertainty are the rule.
Without this transparency, mistrust
and suspicion would pervade the doc-
tor-patient relationship, for what is not
transparent is too often assumed to be
biased or corrupt. Thus, it is important
for physicians to be able to articulate
the basis of their clinical reasoning to
patients, colleagues, and third panics.
No longer can clinicians simply be
silent, or when a clinical opinion is
challenged, simply respond with an "it
is because I say so" paternalism.
GUIDELINES FOR CLINICIANS
What then can a medical profes-
sional and the retaining attorney do
to make sure that expert testimony
will be considered admissible by the
trial judge? There is no question that
the cases we've discussed may con-
fuse clinicians. In an effort to amelio-
rate some of this potential confusion,
we suggest the following guidelines
be used in cases that raise
DaubertlKumho issues:
Integrity
It is imperative that experts follow
the highest standards of their profes-
sion while preparing to testify and
when testifying. Experts must be
objective, independent, and preserve
their integrity in an adversarial
process. They must avoid conflicts of
interest and testify accurately and
appropriately. This is critical if expert
testimony is to be regarded as reliable.
Competence
If Daubert/Kumbo demands that the
expert's testimony represent both the
clinical evidence and medical facts,
then the expert must have credible
experience in the practice of medi-
cine, knowledge and familiarity with
the legal process and standards, and
the ability to offer a valid translation of
clinical decision-making fundamentals
into a meaningful forensic opinion. An
active clinical and consulting practice,
teaching experience and an in-depth
understanding of the relevant facts,
analyses, methods and controversies is
important. Being able to update the
nature and degree of certainty of one's
clinical formulation is also a critical
attribute for the expert who success-
fully fulfills the post- Daubert/ Kumbo
standards.
ClinicalReasoning
The practice of evidence-based
medicine and thrust of Daubert are the
same - the methods used to reach a
conclusion must be scientifically accu-
rate, valid and applicable to the case at
hand. Experts and their retaining attor-
neys need to realize that the new fed-
eral and state court mandates demand
their opinions have strong foundation,
and may only be admissible if the
opinions follow the methodological
rules of clinical decision-making under
conditions of uncertainty, and are reli-
able and relevant. Experts need to
understand the principles of clinical
evidence and clinical reasoning, apply
them to each case and incorporate
them in their opinion formulation. For
example, substitute the word "case"
for "patient" or "patient's illness" and
the practice recommendation quoted
here sounds remarkably like the
Daubert court's recommendations for
expert testimony and can be applied
in other situations: "Does this diagnos-
tic hypothesis adequately explain all
the patient's clinical findings? Is this
hypothesis pathophysiologically co-
herent' Does this diagnostic hypothe-
sis provide the best fit to the pattern of
the patient's illness? Is there no
hypothesis that is simpler' Is this diag-
nostic hypothesis robust to attempts to
falsify it? Does this diagnostic hypoth-
esis best predict the subsequent
course of the patient's illness?" Kassirer
JP, Kopelman ill: Learning Clinical
Reasoning. 32 (991).
Communication
Expert witnesses must understand
that they function as teachers and edu-
cators, and the effective performance
of their role demands a unique com-
bination of oral and written communi-
cation skills and the ability to relate to
many different audiences. The expert
needs to maintain objectivity, yet must
also maintain ongoing dialogue with
continued on page 6
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continued from page 5
the retaining attorney and experts
from other disciplines so as not to
"lose sight of the forest for the trees."
Experts must be able to articulate a
clear, concise, coherent, and COIll-
pelling narrative with respect, authen-
ticity and sincerity to the triers of fact
of the casco This means paying atten-
tion to hath the stated content of the
testimony and the manner in which it
is offered. Content is most effectively
communicated through an in-depth
knowledge. The expert must conduct
a thorough review and analysis of the
data and he familiar with the totality of
the facts, conflict as to facts, and the
literature, and be meticulous in detail,
organization, and reasoning. Effective
experts understand that testimony is
an ongoing educational workshop
with the judge and the jury. Experts
who communicate and collaborate
with attorneys can ensure that on
direct questioning the attorney asks
the fundamental questions that permit
them to simply yet deeply present
their analyses. Furthermore, the expert
must be able to carefully analyze and
anticipate how any direct examination
testimony can be distorted on cross. In
a consultative role experts can also
provide insights that enable the attor-
ney to more effectively cross-examine
opposing witnesses.
Respect the Intangible
...Yet make it tangible. As when con-
sulting to a fellow clinician, experts
have to pass the "dinner companion"
test or the truth of their opinions will
not resonate with the jury or influ-
ence the outcome. In other words,
the expert must be able to make
clear to the layman that his testimony
is reliable and can be trusted. On one
hand, testifying ex perts need to
exhibit sufficient commitment to
their opinions to meet the level of
medical or clinical certainty expected
from one clinician consulting to
another. On the other hand, clinical
commitment and medical certainty
are not satisfied by unsupported
statements from the expert. The
validity, reliability and relevance of
the expert's method need to he illus-
trated in a meaningful manner. The
expert's report is the most tangible
evidence of the expert's methods.
Heuristics
"Heuristics" is a cognitive psychol-
ogy construct that refers to the implic-
it rules of thumb of reasoning that
individuals use to oversimplify com-
plex information-processing tasks.
On one hand, the use of these heuris-
tic devices may be helpful in making
complex decisions in real time. Garb
H: Clinical Judgment and Decision
Making. I AmI. Rev. eli". Psychol 67
(Apr. 2(05), However, used out of
context, heuristics can cause deci-
sion-makers to ignore or misuse
items of rationally useful information,
leading to distorted and systematical-
ly erroneous decisions. For example,
as a result of the over-reliance on the
"vividness" heuristic, one single,
vivid, memorable case can swamp a
mountain of abstract, colorless, yet
relevant data. Heuristics also have
implications for the different ways in
which judges and juries approach the
decision-making process, particularly
given the fact that judges are more
likely to follow precedent while juries
are more likely to follow group deci-
sion-rnaking patterns. A major pitfall
in group decision-making is the vul-
nerability to a risky shift to vivid
examples. If ordinary people's judg-
ments are distorted by cognitive bias-
es, then experts prepared with stag-
gering statistics or other striking
examples have the capacity to take
advantage of the vividness heuristic
and influence the jurors' decisions.
Judges are also vulnerable to the
use of heuristics. In particular, an
individual judge may be especially
susceptible to the "anchoring and
adjustment" and conservatism heuris-
tics. The "anchoring and adjustment"
heuristic is characterized by the deci-
sion-maker corning to a provisional
judgment on the basis of the testimo-
ny heard first, and then adjusting his
or her opinion on the basis of later
testimony. The result is that the earli-
er testimony remains dominant and
pervades the decision-maker's entire
decision-making process. Related to
the anchoring heuristic is the conser-
vatism heuristic. In anchoring, a deci-
sion-maker is influenced by earlier
examples, and anchoring does not
typically occur when the interval
between these examples is long and
filled with other judgments or items.
In conservatism, on the other hand,
the decision maker will continually
be influenced by an opinion he
believes he held earlier, even though
he mayor may not have. In many
areas of the law, research reveals that
the use of such heuristic devices
"permeates both the trial and the
appellate processes." Perlin ML Pre-
texts and Mental Disability Law; The
Case of Competency. 47 Univ. of
Miami L. Rev. 625, 659 (2003).
It is essential that expert witnesses
insulate themselves from the "perni-
cious" use of such heuristics in their
testimony. Perlin ML: There's No
Success Like Failure and Failure's No
Success At All: Exposing the
Pretextuality of Kansas v. Hendricks.
92 Northwestern Univ. L. Rev. 1247
(1998). Being cognizant of the pres-
ence of heuristic devices, and how
they are used can be extremely
important in challenging the method-
ology of opinion formulation of a cli-
nician expert.
While these guidelines are imper-
fect at best, they are aimed at miti-
gating some of the confusion faced
by clinicians retained as experts in
the posx-Kumbo era. The clinical
expert faces many challenges, and
must balance the need to demon-
strate their validity as scientists with
the need to he able to communicate
with laypersons in a cogent manner.
These guidelines serve as an attempt
to help in this endeavor
POST-KuMHU JUSTICE
Kumho has had a tremendous
impact on the role of the testifying
clinical expert in helping the finder of
fact's pursuit of justice. In the post-
Daubert/Kumbo world, there are
more incentives to identify and use
qualified clinical experts and to col-
laborate with them; Daubert/Kumbo
challenges to exclude or limit expert
testimony, the increased complexity
of clinical decision-making and infor-
mation and the growing sophistica-
tion of judges and jurors secondary to
the dissemination of knowledge by
the media and Internet, all contribute
continued on page 7
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continued from page 6
to the need for guidelines distinguish-
ing between acceptable and unac-
ceptable expert evidence.
Although alternatives to the current
system have been suggested, few seem
feasible to apply. It has been recom-
mended that, in complex cases, judges
use their own "experts" or expert pan-
els to assist in deliberations. Walker L,
Monahan J: Scientific Authority: The
Breast Implant Litigation and Beyond.
86 Virginia 1. Rev. 801 (2000). There is
no guarantee, however, that court-
appointed experts will be free from
bias. Although the challenges for the
judicial system in evaluating complex
technical and scientific issues are for-
midable, court-appointed experts "pose
risks, due primarily to outmoded con-
fidence in the certainty of science and
assumption about the neutrality of
experts who are free of party alle-
giances." Deason RE: Court-Appointed
Expert W'itnesses: Scientific Positivism
Meets Bias and Deference. 77 Oregon
1. Rev. 59 (998). Critics have pointed
out that the lise of designated panels
of experts or specialized courts under-
mines the "checking function of the
adversary system." Moreover court
appointment tends to confer upon
court-appointed experts, some of
whom may have subtle yet substantial
conflict') of interest that even they
themselves may not be aware of, the
halo of judicial infallibility. By the same
token, the blind use of clinical guide-
lines as a gold standard has to be
avoided in light of the emerging data
as to conflicts of interest due to poten-
tial vested interests of guideline
authors or their being funded by third
parties (managed care organizations,
pharmaceutical companies) which
may have a stake in the process and
content of forrnularion of such guide-
lines. Taylor R, Giles, J: Cash Interests
Taint Drug Advice. 437 Nature 1070
(2005).
Experiments have been performed
to ascertain the conditions under
which judges accept expert advice. In
a study by Swol and Sniezek (Van
Swol LM, Sniezek JA: Factors Affecting
the Acceptance of Expert Advice. 44
Br] Soc Psychol443 (Sept. 2(05», two
experiments were performed to deter-
mine factors that could increase the
utilization of expert advice. In the first
experiment, five factors were exam-




ined: 1) the judge's trust in the advis-
er; 2) adviser confidence; 3) adviser
accuracy; 4) the judge's prior relation-
ship with the adviser; and 5) the
judge's power to set payment to the
adviser. In the second experiment,
trust was examined without the role
assignment to judge or adviser. The
study found that expressions of high
confidence by the advisers increase
the acceptance of advice, and that
even when participants communicat-
ed freely, face-to-face, written expres-
sions of confidence were the best pre-
dictors of advice acceptance.
As for evidence, it is also worth
noting that there has been a split in
the federal appellate circuits in the
construction of Daubert in subse-
quent cases. For example, regarding
social framework evidence, while the
Third Circuit in Heller v. Shaw Indus.,
167 F. 3d 146 (3d Cir 1999) adopted
a relatively open approach and has
allowed a good deal of clinical judg-
ment to support the opinion, the Fifth
Circuit in Black v. Food Lion Inc., 171
F.3d 308 (Sth Cir. 1999) took a more
strict approach, and only allows opin-
ion on medical causation that is sup-
ported by considerable research.
While Daubert has had a profound
effect on clinical experts and lawyers,
some plaintiffs' attorneys and their
advocates have claimed Daubert to be
unnecessarily burdensome, and have
even gone as far as to say that Daubert
has had a substantial negative effect
on the plaintiff, noting that it adds sub-
stantially to the quantum of evidence
that a plaintiff must introduce, and to
the power of the judge to affect the
outcome of the trial. Lakoff G: A
Cognitive Scientist Looks at Daubert.
95 Am] Public Health 114 (2005). On
the other hand some defense-oriented
commentaries decried the persistence
of Frye in a variety of state courts.
Bernstein D: Quackspertise. The Wall
Street Journal, Sept. 30, 2006, at A9.
CONCLUSIONS
Variability of rule and interpretation
aside, attorneys and judges who pos-
sess some of the same attributes that
are indicative of clinical expertise are
also in the best position to do justice.
These include being open to learning
new facts, making well founded
inferences, and a renewed commit-
ment to open and candid communi-
cation and collaboration.
As the complexity of cases increas-
es it is even more critical that attor-
neys provide the clinical expert with a
complete database of discoverable
information with a realistic timetable
so the expert can review and analyze
both the medical facts and relevant lit-
erature in order to develop an opin-
ion that is transparent and corrigible.
Clinical experts need to be prepared
to engage in a transparent and corri-
gible opinion formulation process
focused on achieving the requisite
degree of medical or chnlcal certainty
(most often, more likely than not)
rather than to simply offer opinions.
Attorneys must eschew clinical
experts whose testimonies are based
on such opinions. Clinical experts
also need to anticipate how their tes-
timony can be distorted on cross-
examination and be prepared to
address such distortions. In this new
post-Daubert/Kumho environment
attorneys and judges will find most
helpful those experts who are able to
articulate not merely their opinion but
the process by which they employed
their expertise in data review and
analysis and methods of inference to
formulate their opinion to the requi-
site degree of professional certainty
required by the finder of fact.
By making clear in a report the
reasoning and analysis which is at
the heart of an opinion formulation,
the twin goals of allowing for earlier
dispute resolution and for prepara-
tion of testimony which can with-
stand Daubert- or Frye- based chal-
lenges if the case goes to trail can
each be achieved.
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